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Fighting	for	Peace	in	Somalia:	A	History	and	Analysis	of	the	African	Union	Mission	(AMISOM),	2007-2017
The	African	Union	Mission	in	Somalia	(AMISOM)	is	the	AU’s	largest,	most	ambitious,	most	complex	and	most
dangerous	peace	support	operation.	It	has	rivalled	and	often	surpassed	United	Nations	peace	missions	in	size	and
challenges.	Paul	Williams	has	written	a	thorough,	extremely	detailed,	comprehensive,	balanced	and	thoughtful
account	of	the	mission.	It	is	indispensable	for	any	policymaker	or	scholar	of	Somalia,	and	a	model	for	how
academic	analyses	of	peace	operations	should	be	written.
First	and	most	importantly,	Williams	has	documented	AMISOM.	He	places	all	of	the	information	about	AMISOM	in	a
single	volume,	organised	in	a	straightforward	and	lucid	manner.	It’s	a	needed	task.
The	first	part	is	a	history:	seven	chapters	that	cover	all	the	phases	of	the	mission	from	its	genesis	in	2004	to	the
debates	about	its	drawdown	and	exit	in	2017.	Originally	envisioned	as	a	regional	operation	by	the
InterGovernmental	Authority	on	Development	(IGAD)	to	support	the	nascent	Transitional	Federal	Government
(TFG),	AMISOM	truly	came	into	being	in	the	wake	of	the	Ethiopian	invasion	of	Somalia	in	2006	to	defeat	and
remove	the	Union	of	Islamic	Courts	and	its	military	wing,	known	as	Al-Shabaab.	Ethiopia	and	its	de	facto	client,	the
TFG,	needed	an	exit	strategy,	and	Uganda	was	ready	to	provide	one,	in	the	form	of	the	backbone	of	troops	for
AMISOM.	Burundi	followed.	Williams	explores	the	motivations	for	each	country	to	send	its	troops—a	mixture	of
seeking	international	approbation,	developing	military	capacity	and	standing,	and	getting	funded.
The	small	AU	force	was	never,	from	the	outset,	a	peacekeeping	operation,	but	rather	a	war-fighting	and	counter-
insurgency	operation.	In	2010-11	it	was	engaged	in	urban	warfare	against	Al-Shabaab	in	Mogadishu,	sustaining
and	inflicting	casualties	at	a	level	that	no	UN	force	would	have	been	prepared	to	do.	In	2012	and	2013,	Kenya	and
Ethiopia	then	re-entered	Somalia,	for	their	own	political	and	security	reasons,	but	in	due	course	becoming	formally
part	of	AMISOM.	As	Williams	details,	however,	each	of	the	troop	contributors	had	its	own	sector	and	conducted	its
own	military	operations	under	its	own	command,	sometimes	with	little	coordination.	The	stated	intent	was	to
develop	the	Somali	National	Army	(SNA)	as	their	national	counterpart,	to	the	extent	that	it	would	be	able	to	take
over	responsibility	for	national	security	including	defeating	Al-Shabaab.	The	SNA	has	shown	little	potential	for
achieving	this,	hampered	by	the	more	local	loyalties	of	its	commanders,	corruption,	and	political	divisions	within	the
Somali	government.	The	AMISOM	contingents	are	themselves	not	innocent	of	the	SNA’s	failings,	as	the	operational
priorities	of	having	local	forces	with	which	each	can	work,	have	overruled	the	national	priority	of	an	integrated	force
with	common	military	training,	doctrines	and	command.
All	of	this,	Williams	recounts	in	commendable	detail,	including	shocking	stories	of	the	failures	of	logistics	in	the	early
days,	leading	to	nutritional	crisis	among	the	AMISOM	troops	at	their	insanitary	military	camp	in	Mogadishu,	and	the
scores	of	fatalities	inflicted	by	Al-Shabaab	attacks	on	isolated	AMISOM	outposts	in	the	rural	areas.	The	UN	Support
Office	for	AMISOM	played	an	invaluable	role,	but	Williams	is	unsparing	in	exposing	the	mismatch	between	the	UN’s
bureaucratic	frameworks	for	providing	support,	and	the	requirements	of	AMISOM’s	mobile	war-fighting.
The	second	part	of	the	book	covers	six	cross-cutting	challenges:	logistics;	security	sector	reform	(SSR,	of	the	SNA
and	police);	protecting	civilians;	strategic	communications	(media	strategy	for	the	Somalis);	stabilization;	and	exit.
Once	again,	Williams	is	thorough	and	balanced.	The	picture	is	one	of	a	mission	that	was	learning	as	it	went,	often
at	horrendous	human	cost	not	only	to	its	own	personnel	but	also	to	Somalis	caught	up	in	the	fighting.	The
frameworks	for	analysis	and	policy	were	often	hopelessly	inadequate	for	the	challenges	at	hand.
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The	blueprints	for	SSR	were	designed	for	a	situation	in	which	a	country	already	possessed	security	institutions	that
could	be	reformed,	rather	than	a	multitude	of	autonomous	security	actors	with	diverse	origins,	identities	and
interests,	that	needed	first	to	come	to	some	form	of	political	accommodation	before	the	more	technical	processes	of
institutional	reform,	professionalisation	and	training	could	begin.	Treading	softly,	Williams	notes	that	the	political
analysis	should	have	been	brought	to	the	fore	rather	than	the	technical	prescriptions.
Williams	account	of	the	haphazard	and	inconsistent	Protection	of	Civilians	(PoC)	policy	is	similarly	revealing.
African	Union	officials	and	AMISOM	commanders	clearly	recognised	the	need	for	a	PoC	policy	and	set	of	practices,
but	had	no	clear	idea	of	how	to	develop	one	in	the	context	of	ongoing	military	operations,	a	government	incapable
of	providing	any	form	of	security	or	policing	in	its	own	right,	and	a	near-total	lack	of	legal	or	technical	advice.
Williams	concludes	that	it	is	unlikely	that	anything	like	AMISOM	will	ever	be	attempted	again:	it	is	too	singular	to	the
Somali	context,	too	complicated	and	too	costly	(in	both	human	and	financial	terms).	But	the	lessons	are	well	worth
examining,	as	similar	issues	will	arise	wherever	there	are	international	efforts	at	armed	stabilisation	and	state-
building.
As	Somalia—and	the	Horn	of	Africa	more	generally—become	sucked	into	the	militarised	transactional	politics	of	the
Arabian	peninsular,	there	are	signs	that	multilateral	peace	missions	will	be	supplanted	by	direct	military	action	and
marketised	loyalty	payments.	To	be	specific,	the	United	Arab	Emirates	and	Saudi	Arabia	have	no	time	for
multilateral	peace	operations	or	state-building,	and	are	dismissive	of	missions	like	AMISOM.	The	ascendancy	of
this	transactional	style	of	politics	could	very	soon	result	in	the	AMISOM	troop	contributors	opting	instead	for	an
Emirati-financed	unilateral	military	assault	on	Al-Shabaab	(perhaps	using	mercenaries),	alongside	financial
sponsorship	of	the	more	amenable	Somali	politicians.	This	is	the	model	of	security	that	the	UAE	and	Saudi	Arabia
have	been	implementing	in	Yemen.	Before	taking	that	route,	the	leaders	of	the	Horn	of	Africa	should	study
AMISOM,	with	all	its	strengths	and	weaknesses.	Williams’	book	is	the	place	to	start.
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